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Leadenhip and the War between_the States
A firestorm swept the United States of America in the 19th century culminating in a

bloodywar which engulfed the nation. The causes of the War betweenthe St.ateshave been
debated since the fighting ceased, yet most historians agree that there are three major issues
which the war was fought over. These include: state versus federal rights to govern, slavery, and
sectionalism. The spark which instigated the conflict occurred in the presidential election of
1860 in which the Republican candidate, Abraham Lincoln, defeated a trio of Democratic
challengers. Within weeks, much of the lower South had seceded from the Union with the
Upper South following suit with President Lincoln's call for 75,000 volunteers after the onset of
hostilities at Fort Sumter, South Carolina on April 12, 1861.1 Any hopes of a peaceful solution
to the conflict disappearedafter this date, and the need for leadership skyrocketedas each side
clamored to fill leadership positions in the military while beginning to train others to fill the
void.
At the outset of hostility in 1861, the United States Anny stood at t 6,367 officers and

men.2 Although such a small number of trained soldiers stood ready to forcibly reunite the
eleven states comprising the Confederate States of America to the Union, few recognized what a
difficult and long war it would be. Many in the North viewed the situation as a rebellion which
would be quelled in three months time. The Unionists recognized their relative strength when

WilliamC. Davis, Battleat Bull Run:A Historyof the FirstMajorCampaign
of the
CivilWar, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1977), 4.
1

Ernest and Trevor Dupuy, TheConu,a.ct
Historyof theCivil War. (New York:
Hawthorn Books, Inc., 1960), 27.

compared with that of the secessionistsbecause of their manufacturingstrength and enonnous

populationsize.
...The populationof the eleven secedingstares consistedof5,500,000 whites and
3,500,000Negro slaves. There were 22,000,000inhabitantsin the twenty-two
Northern states...The ratio of availablecombat manpowerwasabout five to two
in favor of the North. The North, in both manufacture and agriculturewas an
economic entity capable of supportinga protracted

war
....

This indicatesthat the Union could muster a larger military force than the Confederacy. It was
extremely rare for the armies to be of equal size during any battle, often the Northernanny

would have a huge statisticaladvantage. Plus, the huge manufacturingadvantagein the North
seemedto spell doom for the South ftom the beginning. "The North, with its vast manufacturing
and agriculturalresources,would have little trouble in supplyingclothing, equipmentand food
to its anned forces...The major supply source of the Confederateannies...woo.Idbe by capture
from the Union armies. '' 4 These disadvantageswere damagingto the Southernarmies,but were

not the ultimatereason for the demise of the Confederacy. Leadershipwasthe primaryreason
that the North won the war, and it was the reason that the armies of the Confederacywere able to
successfullydefend their nation during the four years of war and with the disadvantagesthey
faced.
The importance of the major generals to the war effort on each side is immeasurable,and

no one disputesthe vital role which their leadershipplayed in the outcome of the Civil War. This
paper wi 11explore the leadership of the three major generalsin commandof the primaryarmies
of the Confederacyand Union. The leadershipof ConfederateGeneral Robert E. Lee, and
3

Dupuy,29.

4

Dupuy,30.

Union GeneralsGeorgeB. McClell~ and UlyssesS. Grantplayed a major part in determining
the course of the war. This paper will explore the concepts of servantand charismatic
leadership,and there applicabilityto Civil War leadersdesignatedby this study. lt will also
view the various powersof influenceused by these leaders to achieve their establishedgoals.
One of the more fascinatingtopics of inquiryis that of followership. This paper hopes to

analyzethe success in which these leadersservedas followers.,and to see how they supported
and raised up their own followers. There are also three leadershipissues which shall be

examinedand providefurther insight in the leadershipof not only the men listed above,but of
countlessotherswho foughtand died for whatthey believedin. The developmentof new
leaders is an importantissue which will help in the examinationof the leadershipevident at this

time.

I. ServantLeadership

The conceptof a ServantLeaderis fascinatingbecauseit seemsto be an oxymoron.
How can one be a servantif tbey are to lead? This seems even stranger when placed in the

contextof militaryleaders. RobertGreenleafarguedthat "The servant-leaderis servant first...It
begins with tbe natural feelingthat one wants to serve, to serve first. ·Thenconsciouschoice
brings one to aspire to lead."' Individualssuch as Jesus Christ, MohandasGandhi, and Martin

LutberKing Jr. immediatelyseem to fit the definitionfor seivant leaders. Each individual
involvedwith the militaryservetheir respectivecommanders,government,andcountry. This

Robert K. Greenleaf:"Servant Leadership,"J. Thomas Wren, e<LTheLeader's
C12mmuig11;
losjghtsOD,Leadershi12
Ib.muah
lbi;Ages.(New York:The Free Press, 1995),22.
5

3

doesnot make every military leader a servant leader. Rather, it is the reasoning behind their
actions which demonstratethe qualities of a servant leader.
With the secessionof the lower South from the Unio~ ColonelRobert E. Leewasplaced
in a difficult position. Colonel Lee)s reputationhad been made during tbe war with Mexico and
he was summonedto WashingtonD.C. on April 18, 1861even as the Virginia legislaturebegan
meetingto discuss secession. Leewas offered command of the enormous federal army which
would be used to quiet the rebellion in the South. The offer was rejected, and the next day
Virginia's secessionwas official. Leeresigned his commissionrather than take up anns against
his state and the South on April 20, 1861.6 In his resignation letter from Federal serviceto
General Winfield Scott, Robert E. Leewrote that "l shall carry with me to the grave the most
grateful recollectionsof your kind consideration,and your name and fame will always be dear to
me. Save in the defense of my native State, I never desire to draw my sword."7 Lee was tom
between the North and South, but felt a commitmentto his home. On April 23, Robert E. Lee
was offered command ofVirginia~s forces, and demonstratesin his acceptance speech a servant
mentality:

...I accept the position your partiality has assigned me, though [I] would greatly
have preferred your choice should have fallen on one more capable. Trusting to
Almighty God, an approving conscienceand the aid of my fellow citizens, I will
devote myselfto the defense and service of my native State, in whosebehalf
alone would I have ever drawn my sword....3
Burke Davis, Gray Fox:RobertE. LeeandtheCivilWat.(New York:Rinehart and
Company lnc, 1956), 12-14.
15

7

[bid, 9

8

TheWartimePapersofR,E,Lee, ed. Clifford Dowdey,(Boston:Little Brown and

Company.1961), 11.
4

RobertE. Leedemonstrateshis desire to be servantfirst by havingpreferredthe positiongo to
one more capablethan he, but be wouldbe honoredto servethe state in whatevercapacity
possible. This continueswith bis desire to serve only in defenseof his state. It was his wish to
serve only in defense of his country~and that willingnessto serve allowedhim to step forward
and lead the armies of Virginia,and eventuallyof the Confederacy. Robert E. Leecould have

chosento retire to his plantationin Arlington,Virginiaand allowedthe war to pass him by, but
his willingnessto serve and protecthis state led to Lee's action. Lee wantedto avoid a war, his
acceptancespeech clearlydemonstrateshis reluctanceto fight~but he desiredto serve his
beloved Virginiaand that Jed to the action he took.

Lee's servantnature towardshis followerscan sti11be seen after fightingthe war through
his surrenderat AppomattoxCourthousein April of 1865. GeneralLeeneededto serve his
soldiers,andthe best way he could accomplishthat wasby surrenderingthe anny and ending
any future sufferingfor the men who followedhim. Leewrote in GeneralOrder,No 9 to his
troops, "but feelingthat valor and devotioncould accomplishnothingthat wouldcompensate
for the loss that must have attendedthe continuanceof the contest, I detenninedto avoid the
uselesssacrificeof those whosepast serviceshave endearedthem to their countrymen.~'9
There
was no longer any real hope for victmy~and even if it could be attainedthe price wasto high.

Leedemonstratedhis continuedserviceto t'hemen by surrenderingthem at Appomattox.

GeorgeB. McClellanwasthe man the North turned to lead their forces after the rejection
of GeneralLee. After a successfulcampaignto help liberate the territory whichwouldlater
becomeWest Virgini, McClellanentered Washingtonas a hero. He wassoon thereafter
1
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assignedto the commandof Union forces in Virginiaand the District of Columbia. In a letter to
his wife. McClellan wrote:
.. .I find myselfin a new and strange position here-President,Cabinet,Oeneral
Scott and all deferringto me-by some strangeoperationof magic I seem to have
become the power of the land ..l see already the main causes of our recent failureI am surethat I can remedythese and that I can lead these annies of men to
victory ...I will endeavor to enclose with this the ''thanks of Congress"which
please preserve. I feel very proud of it General Scott ob_jectedto it on the
ground that it should be accompanied by a gold medal. I cheerfullyacquiesce in
the Thanks by themselves,hoping to win the medal by some other action10••••

The implicatiom of this letter are quite obvious. He refers to himself$ the power of the land,
and believesthat he is the right choice to lead the Union to victory. This hard1ysounds like what
one would expect from an individualwho wished to serve first. McClellanas this paper will
explore further in later sectionsbelieved that it washis place to lead. not to serve or follow.
There is very little humblenessin his fetterwhen comparedto that ofLee. Whereas,Lee was

willingto accept the post offere~ but wished a more deservingcandidatewould be cho~
McClellanindicatesthat he was worthy of the position and the power which came with it. It can
be inferredthat he was willing to seive for his country,not because they requestedit, but
because he deservedit.
It seems that McClellanenjoyed the glory and powerof his position too much to be a
servant leader. GeneralMcClellan apparentlyallowed his reputationand ability to go to his
head. Shortly after his appointmentto lead the Union troops. he was at a dinner party with a
varietyof dignitaries. McClellanMote that he entered the room &'withthe old General leaning
on me-the old veteran (Scott) and his yotmgsuccessor;I could see that many marked the

a,

Ibs ~I !lit 1!111ma
gf <Jmac MQCs;llan;
Ss-1"1"-'
~w;11&;,
ed. Stephen W. Searst (New York: Ticknorand Fields, 1989),70.
10

1~2:l'll~,

contrast."11 This quote indicates that McClellan clearly viewed himself as the man of the hour,
the leader of the future. The dinner party continuedand the :Britishambassadorreferred to

McClellanas the next president of the United States.12 With all the praise and adulationthat
McClellanwas receiving, it is understandablethat his ego was growing, yet from the very
beginning it did not seem as if he was interested in being a servant leader because he was

performinga service to his countrywith the focus being on the benefits which would be received
for leading.
McClellanwould probablyhave been repulsedby the idea that he was a servant,but he
did serve his soldiers. McClellan was always concernedfor the well being of his troops. He
would delay taking military action until he was certain that the risk to his followers would be

minimal. During the Peninsularcampaign,McC1e11an
moved slowly and only attacked when
convincedhe outnumberedthe Confederatesat that particular spot. This slow, deliberate
approachdemonstrateshow he served to protect his troops. :However,McClellandid not
maintaina servant mentalitywhen dealing with his superiors. On June 25, 1862,shortlyafter
the battle of second Manassas,McClellan writes that "Jfl save this army now, 1tell you plainly
that I owe no thanks to you or any other persons in Washington. You have done yom best to
sacrifice this army."13 McClellan is not viewing his actions as servinghis country,rather, he

understandshis job to save the army. The differencebetween the words servingand saving is

11

Stephen W. Sears. GeQmeB,McClellan;
TheYolltllNapoleon.
(New York: Ticknor

andFields, 1988),96.
12

Ibid 96
'

Mitchell,Iosep~
1972), 16.
13

Military
Leaders
intheCivilWar,(New York:G.P. Putnam's Sons,
7

importantwhen exploringthe servant attitudeofleaders. To save someone is to rescue them, to
salvage a situation,which is quite different from being a servant. A leader can save a situation
while still maintaininga servant mentality and focus, yet McClellan is unwillingto view himself
as a servant. Rather, he sees himself as a savior.
On March 9, 1864,Union General UlyssesS. Grant received the commissionof

lieutenant-generalthus promotinghim to the highest ranking military position in the countryas
he now commandedall of the Federal annies. 14 General Grant was promotedto a rank which

had previouslynot existed, but unlike McClellan,Grant did not allow the honor to feed his ego,
he desired onlyto serve his country to the best ofhis capabilities. With his military successesin
the Westerntheater at Forts Henryand Donnelson and the Battle of Shiloh, Grant had fast
entered the limelightof the American public. It took a concertedeffort on the part of the general
to finally dissipatethe talk of his running for President in the election of 1864,because Grant
believed he could best serve the country while he was in the anny. Grant even discussedturning
the promotionto Lieutenant--General
down because he feared it would trap him in Wash1ngton,
and he wantedto serve his country and men by being at the forefront of the conflict 15 Grant
wanted to serve his country,not accept any positions or be seen as a figurehead, rather, he
wanted to do the best job he could to end the war and reunite the union.

Ulysses S. Grant. Personal
Memoirs
of U.S.Grant.(New York: Charles L. Webster and
Company.1894). 404~05.
14

Bruce Catton. GrantTukesCommancl
(Boston:Little, Brown and Company, 1968)
104~110.
1'

A major difference between Generals Grant and McClellan was the ability of Grant to
recognize the importance of others. Shortly after receiving news of his promotion, Grant
dispatched a letter to Generals Sherman and McPherson in which he stated:
...WhiJstI have been eminently successfulin this war in at least gaining the
confidence of the public, no one feels more than me how much of this success is
due to the energy, skill, and the hannonious putting forth of that energy and skill,
of those who it has been my good fortune to have occupyinga subordinate
position under me...but what 1want is to express my thanks to you and
McPherson as the men to whom above all others, I feel indebted for whatever I
have had of success. How far your advice and suggestionshave been of
assistance,you know. How far your execution of whatever has been given you to
do entitled you to the reward I am receiving16••.•
General Grant recognized that the reason he had gained public support, and the reward of a
promotion was due to the effectiveness of his subordinatesas followers, and as leaders. In
essence, Grant wasshowing thanking his followers for their servant leadership,and by doing this
he was demonstratinghis servanthoodto his men.
The impressionof the historian John Lothrop Motley had after meeting Grant probably
best describes how Grant was a servant leader: "'Icannot get over the impression he made on
me ...that of entire loss of self-hood in a great aim which made all the common influenceswhich
stir up other people as nothing to him." 17 The impressionthat Grant made on people was that

of an individual who cared more about his country and duty than about himself. Personal

achievementsmeant very tittte in comparisonto his service to the country.

II. CharismaticLeade111hip
16

Ibid, 123.

17 Ibid,

119.

There are many diff~nt

v1ewsartd ~finttions of charismatic teade~ip.

All the

definitionsrefer to a variety of traits, or actions which a charismaticleader might take. Each of
these theories and traits can fall into three componentsof charismatic leadership. These are
Envisioning.Energizing.and Enabling. If a leader can meet the three components,then it is
probablethat he or she is charismatic. During a war, charisma is often valued in a leader, and
the three major generals of the American Civil War seemed able to provide the charisma
desired.

Envisioning"involves the creation of a picture of the future, or of a desired future state
with which people can identify and which can generate excitement...the leader provides a
vehicle for people to develop commitment,a common goal around which people can rally, and a
way for people to feel successful."18 Simply having a vision is not enough to be considered a

charismatic leader. One must also have the ability and the rhetorical skills to cause the
followersto believe in the attainment of the vision. A Charismatic]eader wou1d"...stir
dissatisfactionwith the p~nt

while they build support for their picture of a new

future...Althoughthe leader's message is important, so is the way it is communicated."19 It is
this ability to develop and communicatea vision which allows one to reach out and unite
followersbehind the vision.

David A. Nadler and Michael Tushman,'"Beyondthe CharismaticLeader:Leadership
and OrganizationalChange," J. Thomas Wren, ed.. TheLeader·s
Companion;
Insiib,ts
on
Leadership
ThroY&b
theAges,(New York: The Free Press, 1995), 109.
18

RichardHughes, Ginnet, and Curphy,
Leadershitr
Enhancin~
theLessons
gf
Experience,(Burr Ridge: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1993). 437.
19

Robert E. Lee wasa visionaryin that he saw a Virginiaat peace as a goal to be achieved.
Lee united his men behind the vision of their homes~their families, and their state. In order to

protect and serve these things they must repel the Northern invaders and fight for their freedom.
His short term visions were for successfulcampaignsand winningbattles in unorthodox
manners,Lee was a risk taker who had a vision of how the battle should go; and more times than
nought it went his way. General Lee assumedcommand of the Army of Northern Virginiawith
its backs facing the gates of Richmond in Spring, 1862,with a numericallysuperiorforce in his
front. Instead ofbracing for a siege as most generalswould have done in this situation,Lee went
on the offensiveattackingMcClellan and forcinghim back during the Seven DaysBattle. Later
that summer,shortly after the Confederatevictory at SecondManassas,the Southernanny
launchedan offensiveinto Marylandin the hopes of alleviating Virginia from the pressuresof
war. Lee had the yjsion of gaining support in the border state ofMary1andduring the offensive.

With a solid victory, the Confederacycould hope for the interventionof Europeancountries.
This vision was shared by all the Southerntroops who marched into the North, and they marched
into Marylandwith optimismfor the future. Once again outnumbered,Lee chose to split his
army into two forces and send one to attack HarpersFerry whlle the other would delaythe Union
force. Althoughthis vision would not be attained as the Anny of Northern Virginiawithdrew
from the North after the battle, the troops sti11hoped for victory.
McClellanwas also a visionary,althoughbis vision was often doubted by those around
him. McClellan's vision wasfor a war in which h1sbrilliance alone would win, and he would
continuein the public's eye until his death. McClellan disagreedwith the tbree prong assault
planned by General Winfield Scott at the outset of the war. He was in favor of one massive

anny to serve as a juggernaut against the Southern states. His vision was for an army of273,000
troops to march South and take each of the major Confederate cities. McCle11anargued that
with the addition of garrison and reserve forces, he would need direct control over three quarters

of the 500,000 men that had been authorized to quell the rebellion.20 This vision was never
officially approved by theFederal government, and McClellan failed to achieve it although he
continually asked for more troops even as his army exceeded I 00,000 combatants.
McClellan was quite capable of transferring his vision to the troops. Not the strategy
above, rather, he was able to cause the men to see themselves as the finest equipped and
grandest of all armies. He helped mold this vision to his troops through their extensive periods

of training and their grand reviews. On November 20, 1861, as McC1e11an
organized a review of
65,000 troops with bands playing, and cannons firing in salute. The spectacle wasattended by

more than 30,000 people includingPresident Lincoln, his cabinet and many other dignitaries
mixed with the commoners who composed the remainder of the crowd.21 Reviews such as this

did wondersfor the Armyof the Potomac as they heard the thousands cheering for them and
read in the papers of how grand and marvelous they were. McClellan did bis best to stroke the
egos of his troops and make them believe in themselves and their purpose of fighting the
Confederacy. For all the speeches, reviews,and training, little action was taken which caused
some wavering of belief in McClellan•s vision amongst the troops and the government.
McClellan bad spread his vision of a grand anny to his men, and they became eager to act and

Stephen W. Sears, 98-99.
Stephen W. Sears, 134.

end the rebellion. As time passed, many troops, as well as the government,began losing faith in
McClellan due to the inactivity of the Anny of the Potomac.

UlyssesS. Grant envisioned a reunited Union. His vision was clear and his methods of
atta1ningit were equally apparent. General Grant spent little time parading his army, instead, be
made sure his force wasprepared and then marched South and into battle. It was his willingness
to fight and show a commitment to achieving his vision that endeared men to him. One of the

way his vision was transferred was in the " ...relentless way Grant reached out to take soldiers
from the bombproof Washington garrison and add them to the fightingforce." He was
attempting to " ...get everyavailable man into the field as early as possible." 22 Grant took men
from the defenses of Washington and other garrisons in an effort to strengthen his force, not
because he feared a larger Confederate force as McClellan ha<Lbut because he wanted to fight
and continue to fight the Southern soldiers. The ideal example occurred at the Battle of the
Wilderness in the Summer of 1864. The Anny of the Potomac fought,and suffered terrible
losses. Grant's vision was demonstratedto his troops in his commitment to fight the South.
Rather than retreating as previous generals had, Grant chose to bring the full force of the Union
army against the Confederates. His refusal to accept defeat, and willingness to face enormous
losses ifit meant victory, won many of Grant's soldiers to share bis vision.
Thesecond component of charismatic 1eadershipis the ability to energize others behind

the vision or goal. The energizing component includes such things as seeking, finding and using

22 Bruce Catto~

163.
13

success. expressingpersonal confidence and demonstratingexcitement. 23 A Charismaticleader
will "build trust in their leadership and the attainability of their goa1sthrough seemingly
unshakableself-confidence,strength of moral conviction, personal example and sacrifice of
unconventionaltactics or behavior." 24 This second componentis equallyimportant in
determining whether or not a leader can be consideredcharismatic.
Robert E. Lee replaced the wounded Joseph Johnston, during the Peninsula campaign, on

June 1, 1862. Leesent an orderto the soldiers of the Anny of Northern Virginiaannouncinghis
replacement of General Johnston. Lee wrote of his disappointmentover the loss of Johnston and
that "He hopes his absence will be but temporary. and while he will endeavor to the best of his
ability to perform his duties. he feels he wfl1be totally inadequateto the task unless he sha11

receive the cordial support of every officer and man." 25 General Lee was attemptingto gain the
supportof his disheartenedtroops at the outset, but it was with the first of numerousvictories
over the Seven Days Battle that succeeded in energizingthe Confederatesoldiers as the Union
anny was pushed from the gates of Richmond back down the Peninsula. Lee was successfulin
seeking, finding and using success with some unorthodoxtactics as the undennanned Army of
Northern Virginia went on the offensive against the much larger Union force. While success in
battle won the hearts of the troops, General Lee gained support from hts officers after cath.ng
them all together shortly after taking over and discussedhis plans and listenedto their ideas.
David A. Nadler and Michael Tushman,"Beyond the CharismaticLeader:Leadership
and OrganizationalChange," J. Thomas Wren, ed., TheLeader's
Companion:
Insights on
Leadership
Through theAges. (New York: The Free Press, 1995), l 09.
24

Richard Hughes, Ginnett and Curphy,438.

2s Ed., Clifford Dowdey,

181.

This altowed Lee to succeed in energizinghis officer corp because "the field officers who were
to lead the Anny of Northern Virginia felt themselves vital -partsof the growingforce; they had
the feeling that the commanderknew their problems and valued their opinions."26 Meetings
such as this built trust between GeneralLee and his officers and allowedthem to see the
confidencethat he had in them, the common soldiers, and himself. With the belief that their
commanderwas committed to victory and was willingto trust them. they became energizedfor
the future of the Anny of Northern Virginia.

There are many examples which demonstratethe success General Lee had in energizing
his men. In early summer, 1864. the army of Northern Virginia clashed with the Anny of the

Potomac duringthe first offensiveled by General Grant at the Battle of the Wilderness. The
Wildernesswasan area of thickets, trees, and vines which made vision and coordinationnearly
impossible. It also helped to negate the huge size advantagethat the Federa1force had. On June
Sth. after a bloodybattle, the Confederateforce was pushed back, disorganized,with units
scattered across the battlefield. Many of the soldiersbegan to withdrawfrom the field
anticipatinga retreat and the disorientationof the troops made defeat a real possibility. General
Lee recognizedthe disarraywhich threa1enedto destroyhis army and moved to organize and

lead the counterattackhimself. ''But the soldiers would have none of it. One of them grabbed

the horse's bridle, and Jed the fuming generalback down the road, while his comrades shouted:
'General Lee to the rear, General Lee to the rear!~27 The men rallied and moved to attack. The

presence of Lee and his willingnessto risk bis own life energized the troops. Their love for the
26 Burke Davis, Gray
27

Fox..
(New York: Rinehart & Co. Inc.• 1956), 80.

Dupuy,292.
15

general and desire to please him led to their reorganiz.ationand counterattack which saved the
Confederatearmy from destruction. Their counterattacksucceededin stoppingthe Federal
advance,but the Northernersdid not retreat as General Grant used his numericalsuperiorityto
flank the Confederatesand force them to retreat. They cared for their leader so much tha1they
refused to enter battle with him at the front because of the likelihoodbe would be killed

Another example occurred at the surrenderof the Army of Northern Virginia at
Appomattox Courthouse on April 9, t 865. As Lee returned to his anny after surrenderingto

Grant,the gloom,disappointment, and despair that hung over the air was lifted as he
approached One of Lee's soldiers, Charles Blackford described the scene.

...Whenthey sawthe we11-known
figureof GeneralLee approaching,there was a
general rush from each side of the road to greet him as he passed, and two solid

wansof men were formed along the whole distance. As soon as he entered his
avenue of these old soldiers, the flower of the anny, the men who had stood to
their duty through thick and thin in so many battles, wild, heartfelt cheers arose
which so touched General Leethat tears filled his eyesand trickled down his
cheeks as he .rodehis splendid charger,hat in hand, bowing his
acknowledgments. Many expressionsof confidence and affection were
given...One man, I remember, extended his arms, and with an emphatic gesture,
said, "I love you just as well as ever. General Lee!"28
The valiant men who comprisedthe Armyof Northern Virginiahad just lost the war which they
had fought so dearly for. Yet, the presence of General Leeenergizedand brought them to

cheers.
General McClellanalso saw the importance in energizinghis troops. The personal
confidencethat McClellanhad can be seen in his return to commandthe Army of the Potomac

Blackford, Charles, Memoirs
of LifeIn andOutof theAn;ny in YifiiniaPurin1t
the
WarBetween
theStates.Ed. Susan Blackford, (Lynchburg,VA: J.P. BeHCompany,Book, Job
and CommercialPrinters, 1896),Appendix V.
28

for the second time. McClellanupon hearing of his commissionwrote his wife that ~AgainI
have been called upon to save the country."29 McClellanneverlackedself•confidence.
and that
wassomethingwhichwascontagiousamong the-troops. One ofMcCleUan)sstrengthswas in

his abilityto buildtrust amonghis soldiers.Betweenthe buildingof confidenceof his troops
with the grand marches and parades,McClellanhimsetf••heHevedmorale was related directly to

the confidenceofficersandmen felt in the generalcommanding:if theybelievedin him they
would believe in the tasks he set for them."'.)()
How did the man who wouldbecomeknownas

''LittleMacl'accomplishthis? McClellan would ·•oftenstop to chat casuallywith a squad or
company. He might ask the men if they werelready for a brush, with the Rebels, and when they
shoutedthat theywere,he promisedto risk it with them.••11 It wasthis abilityto energizehis
troops by buildingtrust and showingself--confidencewhichhelped McClellanachieve some
charisma. However~as time passedhis men were itching ior a battle~yet they were still
endearedMcClellan f'orthe good care he providedthem.
Ulysses S. Grant had self..con:fidence
in his plan to defeat the Soutbbecause of his

recognitionof tbe disparitybetweenthe two sides in regards to manpower,and economics.By
talcingthe war to the Southhe was guaranteedeventua1successif nothing else than for the
attrition which wouldoccur in the Southernarmy. He sought out and found successon the
battlefiel~ and it servedto provide him withthe best way of buildingtrust and energizing
soldiers. When Granttook commandof the Army of the Potomac, he had the reputation of a
29 Ed., Stephen Sears, 435.
30 Stephen Sears. 110.
31
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winner from his exploits in the Western theater where he earned the nickname of"Unconditional
Surrender" Grant for forcing rebe1sto surrender unconditional1yat Fort Henry and Donelson.
He took the anny, and demonstrated that they were going to be used and they were going to fight

the battles necessaryto win the war. During the campaignfor Richmond,numerousbattles were
fought with dreadful losses for the federal forces, yet "the army remained capable of rapid

movement,and its morale seemedto be as high as ever because when all was said and done the
soldiers felt that they had made genuine progressin a monthof campaigning." 32 Althoughthe
anny was losing enormousnumbers, the men were stilJ confident because they had been winning
engagements with the Army of Northern Virginia and were marching towards victory. As one

Umon soldier said. "Grant does not know how to retreat...confidenceis unboundedin him."33
This confidence and desire to win was contagiousamong the troops and helped energize them
for continued bloody battle. He provided the men with tangible success which energized them
because they had never achieved that under their previous leaders.
The third component of a Charismatic leader is that of Enabling. This occurs when the

leader is capable of demonstratingpersonal relationswith the followers,and expresses
confidence in their troops.34 This might be the most di-fficuitcomponent to achieve in that
expressingconfidencein ones troops often means allowing them to make their own decisions.
General Lee was very accessible to his men. He cared for his men tremendously as
demonstrated in his first actions in 1861 which were to ask the governor of Virginia about the

32 Bruce Catton, 268.
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arrangementsthat were being made to properlysupplythe troop.35 Lee was concernedover the
Jack of suppliesbeing sent by the states to the troops because the Confederatestates were

withholdingsupplies to be used on their home guards, or militias rather than for the army. His

earlyconcernswas overthe care of his troops,becauseif theywerenot taken careof':then
victory couldnever be achieved. He also demonstratedhis desire to encourageand enablehis
soldiersthrough his common dealings with them. A courier,CaptainBlackford,wrote that "'He
(Lee) alwayshad some word tu say which cheered me, asked me questions as to where different

brigades or batteries were moving, or somethingwhich, if not useful to him, made me feel of

someconsequence."36 Leewould enable his soldiersby makingthem feel important,he was
able to make each individualfeel as if they were making important contributionsto the war
effort.

One of General Lee's greatest strengths was his ability to show confidence in his
fo11owersby trusting them to take the right actions. As his generals proved themselves,Lee
would allow them to do more things independently. This did not always work out for good as
demonstratedby his wi11ingnessto allow General J.E.B. Stuartto ride freely at Gettysburgto do
whatever damage he could backfired when General Stuart failed to provide the main

Confederateforce with informationon the positions of the Northerntroops.37 This forced the
Anny of Northern Virginia into a battle it was ill-preparedto fight. However,by enabling his
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subordinatesto make their own decisions, and by expressingconfidence in their decisions,

securedLee his greatestvictory.

The Battle of Chancellorsvillewasthe crowning achievementof Lee~senablingof
followers. General Lee wasdiscussing strategywith General Thomas"Stonewall" Jackson. He
proposed a flanking maneuverby which a large contingent of Confederates would move down

the battle line and attackthe exposedflank of the Union anny. "Since the momentLee
suggested it, the move had grown in Jackson's mind. He had no intention of merely rattling

Hooker,of tryingto distractthe Federals...He meantto destroythe Unionarmy.":ut
Jacksonhad
thought the plan over and wantedto enlarge it. Duringthe maneuver,Lee wouldbe left with
14,000troops versus the 70,000 Union soldiers. His response to this wastwo words: "Go on."39
Leedid not know exactlyhow Jackson's plan would work or if it wouldeven be successful,yet

he had confidencethat if Jacksonrecommendedit then it could be done.
McClellan definitely lacked the enabling quality of a charismatic leader. Although he

had goodrelationswith the troops and cou1dinspire confidencein them. he simplycou1dnot
enable his followers to take the initiative. Shortlyafter being assigned command of the Army of

the Potomacin 1861, he wrote his wife: "I must ride much eveiy day for my anny coversmuch
space, and unfortunatelyI have no one on my staff to whom I can entrust the safety of affairs."°''
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If McClellan could not trust his staff to look after the armywhen it was simply training in the

outskirtsof WashingtonD.C.~how could be hope to enable others during battle? The answer is
si.mple,he did not expect anyone else to step forwardduring battle. He had that little confidence
in the capabilityof his men to Jead while having extremeconfidence in his own leadership
abilities, McClellan was angry that the president had intervenedand appointed corps
commandersbecause he had planned on assigningpeople to the position after they :hadproven
themselves in battle. This would mean that McClel1anhimself would be directing over t 30,000

men himselfin the first majorengagement41 This neveroccurreddueto the presidential
interventionand the forcible institutionof officers to lead segmentsofMcCleUan·s anny. It
does not seem as ifMcClellan had confidence in anyonebut himself.
General Grant seemed to relate more with Robert E. Lee in this componentthan he did
with McCleUan. Grantencouragedand rewardedhis troopsfor taking actionson their own. As
they showedtheir ability, Grant's confidencewould build and they would be given even more

dauntingcha11engesto pursue. General Phil Sheridan is a prime example of this. The feisty
calvary commander showed his ability at the battle of Chattanooga. The union force was

trapped in the city of Chattanoogawith the Confederateforces entrenchedin the mountains
surroundingthe city. His men weresent to stonn MissionaryRidge, but after taking the first line
of rifle pits, he realized his orders were vague and sent for clarification. While waiting he chose

to continue pushing forwardand eventuallytook MissionaryRidge from the deeply entrenched
Confedemtes.42 This sparked confidence in Sheridan as Grantrecognizedhis ability to lead men
41
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and think for himself. Later, at the Battle of the Wilderness,General Sheridan told his superiors
that ifit were left to him he would take his calvary and "whip" J.E.B. Stuart. When Grant heard
of this, his response was:"Did Sheridan say that?...He usuaUyknows what he is talking about.
Let him go ahead and do it...43 Grant did not know what actions Sheridanwould take, but he had
the confidence in his subordinatesthat he waswilling to allow him to take action without

understandingwhat the plan was.

Ill Powen and Influences
There are a variety of Powers and Influenceswhich can be used by a leader to enforce his
will or to help motivatethe fo11owerstowardsthe goal or objective. These are:
I) Reward Power-the ability to mediate the distributionof positiveor negativereinforcers
2) CoercivePower- the capacity to dispense pumshments to those who do not comp1ywith
requestsor demands.
3) LegitimatePower-Authoritythat derives from the power holder's legitimate right to require
and demand compliance.
4) Referent Power-Influenceover others that is based on their identificationwith, attractionto,
or respect for the power holder.
5) Expert Power-Power that derives from others' assumption that the power holder possesses
superior skills and abilities.44
It is interestingto note that the generals all shared certain powers. As in any organization,the

military, uses a variety of methodsto motivate soldiers to work towardsthe goal This paper

wi11focus on reward, coercive, and legitimatepowers because of their importancein a military
environment.
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Each of the leaders being examined demonstrated the use of Reward power through
their ability to reward their respective followers through a variety of means. A soldier could be
rewarded in many different waysduring the Civil War. The first was through commendation
such as meda1s.awards. and specialrecognition during paradesor military reviews. Another
way in which the leaders could exert reward power is through promotions. The military is a

hierarchical structure with ranks ranging from the 1owestcommon soldier to the general in
command of all Union or Confederate forces. Soldiers were often rewarded for their efforts to
perfonn their duty to the best of their ability in the hopes of attaining the goa1shared by all in

the military. A soldier could be promotedthrough a varietyof levels for officers and common

so1ruers.This upward mobility also provided means through which individualscould attain
success and elevate themselves from low to high status in the military which could translate to a
higher social status after the war. Another intriguing way in which troops were rewarded by

their commandingofficers was by placing units in a position of honor for battle. For example,
shortlybefore the second battle of Manassastook place, Captain GreenleeDavidson company
was

transferred. Captain Davidson vvrotehome that:
...General Lee in anticipation of a fight has assigned my companytemporarilyto
General [WinfieldS.] Featherstone's Brigade. The Brigade is one of the best
fighting commands in the army and is always sent in the advance. I consider it a
complimentto be assigned to such a Brigade.45

Companies, Battalions, and even entire corps often considered their placement in the army or in
a battle as a reward. Captain Davidson, and his company,believed that they were rewarde<lfor
their valor in previousengagements by being assigned to a brigade steeped in success and
4~
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prestige that wasknownfor leadingthe charge. Casualtiesin thosebrigadeswereoften high,but
it was consideredan honorto be trusted10 be the first Unionor Confederateunit to engagethe

enemy.
Anothertype of power exertedby the generalsof this study wasthat of coercive power.

Coercivepowerhas been definedas the abilityto punishthose wbo fai1to complywith the
instructionof leaders. Lee.McClellan,andGrantall exhibitedcoercive power as a means to

keep the armyin 1ine. The greatestsin that a soldiercouldcommitnextto treasonwas that of
desertion in the face of the enemy. Reasons for desertion varied which led to the designationof

troops as AbsentWitboutLeave(AWOL).Thesewere soldierswhowere not presentbut not
believedto havedeserted. This most often occurredafter battleswhensoldierswereseparated
from their comradesdueto the confusionthat set in on a batt1efie1d~
or whentroopswere faced
with a familyemergencyand wouldrushhomewithoutgetting proper authorization..Ttoccurred
as men wouldgo visit lovedoneswho livednear the anny encampmentor whi1ethey were out

foragingfor muchneededsuppliesand food This wasa problemthat was rampantin both
Unionand Confederatearmies. A Unionsoldier,John Billin~ wrotethat "there wasno time in

the historyof the Anny of the Potomac, after its organiution by McClella~ when it reporred
less than one-fourthits full membershipabsent without leave."46 Soldierswere most often
reprimandedand their permanentmilitary records would record that they were AWOLand list
the dates that they were missingfrom active duty.
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Genera\ Lee had final authority over the executions since the so1diershad appealed their
punishment. Jackson argued that the punishmentsshould not be overturnedbecause then 1he
troops would see this as an opportunityfor them to disobey military orders and law without fear
of consequences. Genera]Lee agreed with Jackson on this case and approvedthe three death
sentences. Thus, coercive power is seen as a means of punishingtroops and demonstratingto
the remainingsoldiersthat not fo11owingthe orders of the leaders potentia11ycould be met with
punishment. EdwardMoore, a cannoneerunder Jackson viewed these executions "as a warning
to others,the whole divisionwas mustered out to witness the painfully solemnspectacle."so
Making the entire division view the executionsas a warning was in effect demonstratingthat the
leaders have the write to punish the troops.
Althoughthose guilty of being separatedfrom their units for short periods of times were
often not punished. those guilty of other offenses were often severely punished In the Federal
anny. a soldier who waslabeled a coward would be drummed out of camp. Billings Mites that
"Whenevera man's courage gave out in the face of the enemy, at the earliest opportunityafter
the battle he wasstripped of his equipmenl'Sand uniform, marched through the camp with a
guard on either side...while a fife and drum corps brought up the rear.''' 1 In this situation,the
leaders would attempt to instill courage in the troopsby punishingcowards. The men were
stripped of all military belongingsand humiliated as they were marched out of camp in front of
their feltow troops to the tune of the fife and drum. This demonstrationof coercive power was
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effective in that it wouldmake a soldier think twice before fleeing during a battle. Most Civil
War companieswere organizedby states. counties)and cities before being attachedto the anny.
This meant that they were humiliated in front of neighbors,friends. and family. Word would
certainly reach their homes about the incident and they wou1dbe haun1edby their actions for the
rest of their lives.
Legitimatepower is another which is prevalent in the military during the Civil War. The
foUowershad to believe that the leaders had the right to order them. The War Between the
States can almost be viewed as a war over legitimacy. Generals Grant, and McClellan were able

to exert legitimatepower because their soldiers had taken an oath to their country. They

believedthat the UnitedStateswasthe lawfulgovernment,and it was fightingagainstthe states
which had illegaUywithdrawnfrom the Union. This belief in the validity of the United States

transferredLegitimatepowerto the leaders of their armies,becausethe valid governmenthad
placed those officers in leadership positions.
The same holds true for the Confederates. They were fighting for what they believed to

be the legitimategovernme~ and thus the legitimateJeadersof the mili1aty. After the war~
Robert E. Lee wasquestionedby the Congressof the United States and was asked if the South
had committedtreason by seceding. Lee repJ;edthat "most Southernersbelieved secessionllad
been the responsibilityof the states rather than ofindividuals ...Theact of Virginia,in
withdrawingherself from the United States, carried me along as a citizen of Virginia; her laws
and her acts were bindingon me.~"2 The Southernerswho recognizedthe ConfederateStates of
America would acknowledgethat governmentas having legitimatepower overthem. 286 out
' 2 MarshallFishwick,
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of 1,036 United States Anny officers resignedtheir commissionsand joined the Confederate
military when the Confederacywas first formed.sJ The recognition of legitimacyis seen in the

actionsof these officers.
...With the flagrant exceptionof General Twiggs' treasonable surrender in Texas.
these officers honored their oath of allegianceto the United States unti1their
actual departure from their posts. The great majority were most meticulous in
turning over their commands and accounts in strict conformityto regutations54 ...
The Southern officers granted legitimacyto the governmentof the United States with power
over them as Jong as they actively seived in the army. The legitimate power that the United
States had over these men wasrecognized by most and because of it they honored their
commitmentand oath to the governmentof the United States until their resignationswere
accepted and they could leave their post These troops honored the legitimacyof the United
Sta1esby performingtheir duties and handing over their commandwithout having underminedit
or purposelycaused any damages. These-soldiers even returned the equipmentgranted them by
the governmen~even though it would have been of great benefit to the ConfederatemiHtary.
As the soldiersgained confidence in their leaders and began respectingwhat they were
doing, then the leaders gained referent power. Expert power is something each of these generals
had because it wasassumed that they would each possess it, although whether or not General

McC1ellanactuaHyheld expert power is a question.

IV. Fotlowenhip
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Richard Hughes, Robert Ginnett,and GordonCurphy argue that ••Peopleare motivatedto
meet five basic sorts of needs."·" The five stages form a hierarchyand has been referredto as
Maslow's Hierarchyof Needs. The lowest stage is that of Physiologicalneeds, then Security
needs, BeJongmgnessneeds, Esteem needs, and finally Self-actualizationneeds. These five
stages of need should be providedfor if one wishes to successfullymotivate followers
The first stage of physio1ogicalneeds is simplythe basic needs for survival,they include
food, shelter,and water. GeneralLeeand the Confederacydid the best theycould to provide the
soldierswith anof these items, althoughas the war ran on, they began to Josethe ability to take
care of the troops, so rations began to shrink. The Rebels often went withouthaving their basic
needs met. but because oftbe successthey achievedin battle, the men were wil1ingto surviveon
the bare necessities. However,when the end drew near for the Confederates,the inabilityto
meet these needs began to effect the followers. Theywere no longer winningon the fie]d of
battle, so the higher level needs, such as esteem, were not being met. This made it much more
dffiicu1tfor the fo11owersto surviveoff the minimumfulfillment ofphysio1ogicalneeds. The
surrenderof the Anny of Northern Virginiaoccurred after Federalcalvary under General
Sheridancaptured severaltrainloads of rations meant for the Confederates.theyhad Htt1echoice
but to capitulatebecause they could not even care for their most basic needs.56 The two
Confederateinvasions of the North were done for a variety of reasons, one of which was to
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for the future. Lee continued to serve, to lead, and he did it by attempting to heal the wounds of
a divided nation. In honor of Lee for his serviceto the sta1eand to the coIJege,the school
changed its name to Washington and Lee. After a failed presidential bid in 1864, McClellan
retrred although he consistently tried to remain in the eye of the public. ln 1877. he was
nominated for the governor of New Jersey, a post to which he was quickly elected. Although he

never servedin the capacityof Presidentas the British ambassador had predictedback in 186I.,
McClellan made the best of his situation andcontributed greatly to the state of New Jersey.64 He
successfully guided the state through difficult economic and political times before retiring to
write his memoirs. General Grant would continue in the pubUc's eye as well as he accepted the

nomination for President of the United States where he served two terms in office. Grant viewed
things such as this as an opportunity to continue to serve his country and although his

administrationfaced many controversies and scandals, he was always wiHingto serve his
countty in whatever capacity possible.

VI. Leader Development
It is amazing how important leader development is in a conflict such as the ctvil war.

The attrition rate for leadersat afl levels were quite high because they could dJe from disease or
battle on any given day. The development of leaders in the Northern and Southern anntes is
very interesting and goes a long way in explaining the armies and where they stood during the

war.
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At the outbreak of the Civil War, the South had numerous military leaders step forward
because they had resigned their commissionsin the United States Anny, or bad served as
instructorsat a variety of military academies. From the early stages of the war, Southernleaders
were given more leewayand independence1oact StonewallJackson,and J.E.B. Stuart struck
havoc at the Union forces with their freedom to move and make decisions based on their
situations. This offered a stark contrast 10 the Union army who under McCle11anhad no
freedomofleadership, nor were efforts made to develop young leaders becauseMcClellan felt
that only he could lead the armyto victory. It is no wonderthat leaders such as Gran1,Sherman,
and Sheridan emerged from the Wesrem theater where Grant had altowed his commandersome
autonomyand as they provedthemselves more and more.
As the war progressedand Southern leaders died, fewer and fewer people stepped
forward to fiHthose positions. With the loss of StonewallJackson at 1heBattle of
Chancellorsville,there was no developmentof new leaders to replace him, and those who filled
his ro1eoften failed The Army of Northern Virginia, under Lee, also did a goodjob of
developingleaders. Lee quickly focusedon the likes of Generals StonewallJackson, and J .E.B.
Stuart who provedtbemse1veson the battlefield and to the men. Jackson especia11ywas a
success in whom Lee could entrust the most daring of plans. Historians familiar with the faith

Lee had in Jackson wrote that ''So Jongas Jackson was alive, 1herewas never any doubt in Lee's
mind to whom he should entrust the most daring venture.••MThe importantdistinctionis that
this held true while Jackson was alive. GeneralLeehad grown so accustomedto his
subordinatesbeing effective fottowersthat when Jackson died, he never developedanyone to
6s
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n:plact: the missingleadership. Jackson died of wounds received at the Battle of
ChanceUorsville when he was accidently shot by his own men while scouting ahead of the army.
In the ensuing Northern invasion, General Lee suggested that General Ewell take the high

ground He did not make it an order because he was used 10 hayjng someone like Jackson taking
a suggestionand effectively canying it out with their personal expertise and additions to the

plan. This was a crucial mistake in the battle, because once the Union gained control of the high
ground,. there was little chance for victory by the Confederates.

It wasthe loss of trained,

effective leaders and the fai]ure to train replacements that began 1o cos1the Confederatesat
major engagements. The South had started the war developing many leaders, but as the war
progressed it became harder for them to develop and once that process broke down, they began

to lose more battles which eventually cost them the war. Defeats at Gettysburg,Atlanta, and
Petersburg can be attributed to the failure to develop new leaders. The Union progressed on an
opposite course. They started out losing many batttes during the war because they did not do a
good job of devdoping leaders. However, as the war progressed and they began to developthe
likes of Sherman and Sheridan who could operate independentlyand still achieve the desire

goals secured victory for the Northern force.
While McClellan was in command of the Eastern Theater for the Union forces; he did

not beJieve in enablingothers. As demonstratedin the earlier quote, McClellan wanted to
command all of the troops without delegating responsibilityto any other leaders. This failure to
develop new leaders hindered the war effort for the Union. McClellan was replaced as
commander of the Army of the Potomac on two different occasions. His replacements fared

1itt1ebetter against Robert E. Lee and the Confederate Anny of Northern Virginia. McCle1lan

had failed to develop these individualsas leaders, and they learned from observingMcClellan

lead the anny. The resu1tof this was a mixture of ideas on what proper action shou1dbe.

GeneralBurnsidewas overlyaggressive.most likely from.observingMcCle1lan'shesitancy.
This 1edto his leading the Anny of Potomacin an unwise assault on the entrenched Confederate
troops at Fredericksburg. The resultingblood bath led to his replacementwith General Hooker.
·'FightingJoe" Hooker was also more aggressive,yet he did not cover the details which
McClellan did, thus leaving him susceptible to the flank attack by StonewallJackson. Finally,
General Meade fought the Confederatesto a standstill at Gettysburg.yet he had adopted the
slowness of McClellan and did not pursue the weakened Confederates.
This 1edto the appointmentof General Grant as commanderof the Anny of P01omac.Grant
spent the early years of the war fighting in the Western theater where McClellanhad little
control and even Jess interest This freedom from the influence ofMcCleUan a11owedGrantthe
freedomto develop and train his subordinates. A testament to the Grant's developmentof
leaders in the West lies in those individual leaders· success as independentcommanders. When
Grant assumed command of the Anny of the Potomac, he brought many of his corps
commandersftom the West with him. He aJso chose to place key subordinatesin positions
where theycou\d demonstratetheir own leadership abilities. He placed General William
Tecumseh Shermanin command of an army and gave him free reign with tbe onJyorders being
to advance towards Atlanta and cut the heart out of the Confederacy. His Calvary commander
Phil Sheridan was given freedom to maneuverand engage the Confederatecalvary as he saw fit.
Granthad recognizedthe abi1ityof these men and entrusted them to make correct decisions in

order to secure the future of the war.
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The generals on both side would stand by the decisions of their followers. General Lee
trusted Jackson, or Stuart to make independentdecisions and to lead the troops to the best of

their ability. Grant. did the same. When General Sherman's treaty with General Johnston was
not approvedby the government,Grant was orderedto go dovm and take over. Secretaryof War
Stanton,, "ordered Grant to take over personal commandof Sherman's armies. Grant, refusing to
do this, soon calmed ruffled feelings." 66 Grantjoined Sherman in North Carolina, but allowed

Shermanto continue negotiating by himself. General Grant was available as a resource for
Sbennan to use in comingto tenns with the surrender of the ConfederateArmy led by General
Joseph Johnston. He trusted the decisions and efforts of his subordinatesand did not interfere,
Grant was just present to offer his opinion and expertise when Sbennan needed it.

VIX. Conclusion
Many individuals bave associatedthe success that the Confederacyhad early in the war
with the leadership of its generals. They also assumethat the demise was due to the seemingly

overwhelmingadvantagethat the North had in regardsto manpower,and manufacturing
capabilities. Althoughthe North did have a large advantage,it was their leadershipthat
ultimately won the war for the Union. As the war dragged on, the South began to lose its

leadership edge as the North found a general who was equally capable of1eading.
[t

seems that when examining the wide variety of types of leadership, traits, and powers

that the primary military leader in the-South, Robert E. Lee, had a sizeable advantage to that of

his adversary,GeorgeB. McClellan. McClel1anfai1edto train new leaders, he did not search for
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effective followers. nor did he effectively fotlow his superiors. Rather, McClellan seems to have
viewed himself as the onJyone truly capable of leading the Army of the Potomac to victory.
McClellan's failure to successfully lead his troops to victory, and the same failure which his
subordinates bad when they had the opportunity led to the introduction of General lTiyssesS.
Grant to the Eastern theater.

It is interesting to see that in a hierarchy. such as the military, when the commanding
officer fails to lead, then his subordina1esare not prepared 10 lead, and the troops cannot
effectively follow. General Grant was operating in the Western theater oftbe War between the
States and created his own system ofleadership. When Grant was promoted and transferred to
command of the Army of the Potomac, the only thing which changed was the leaders at the top
of the command structure. Y~ the men who comprised the Anny of the Po1omacd1dnot
change. These followers were not transplanted from the West. Rather, they for the first time
had strong leadership which allowed them to become more effective followers and a11owthem

to fulfill the goal of winning the war.
The system of leader development that Robert E. Lee used was quite similar to the one
Grant had in the West. Lee and Grant both allowed their subordinates to prove themselves in
battle and slowly take more and more responsibi1ity until their followers were effective leaders.
With the death of Stonewall Jackson, General Lee failed to replace him because he found no one
capable of stepping right into the same place Jackson held. General Lee treated the variety of
generals who attempted to replace General Jackson as if they were of the same mold. He did not

s1ow1ybring anyone along, he continuedto order them the same way he would have ordered
Jackson. At Gettysburg, Lee suggested that Ewell take action knowing that if it had been

Jackson that order would have provided the freedom to take the initiative and win the battle.
Yet, Ewen had not developedto that point yet and needed strict orders. The la."'<
in leader
developmentgreatly hurt the South in the latter portion of the war.
Once the Army of the Potomac obtained effective 1eaders,they were able to bring the full
weigntofthe North against the Army of Northern Virginia. With sound leadership.Grant was
able to make the manufacturing and manpower disadvantagedevastatingto the Southern cause.
[t was

the leadershipof both sides which shaped the course of the War between the States, and

ultimately decided the outcome. The Civil War provided an outlet for many leaders to develop.
Many of the leaders of the war, continued to lead after the war in an effort to heal the wounds

and make the Union whole. Leaders on both sides, Lee with his work in education, Grant and
McClellan in their political lives all made a difference in the post war era. Just as their
leadership made a differenceto the men whom they were endeared to. Their names wil1live on
in the annals of Americanhistory as men who were willing to lead when the countty most
needed ]eadership.

